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Abstract 
This paper contrasts the effects of trade, inward FDI and technological development 
upon the demand for skilled and unskilled workers in the UK. By focussing on 
industry level data panel data on smaller firms, the paper also contrasts these effects 
with those generated by large scale domestic investment. The analysis is placed 
within the broader context of shifts in British industrial policy, which has seen 
significant shifts from sectoral to horizontal measures and towards stressing the 
importance of SMEs, clusters and new technology, all delivered at the regional scale. 
This, however, is contrasted with continued elements of British and EU regional 
policy which have emphasised the attraction of inward investment in order to alleviate 
regional unemployment.  The results suggest that such policies are not naturally 
compatible; that while both trade and FDI benefit skilled workers, they have adverse 
effects on the demand for unskilled labour in the UK.  At the very least this suggests 
the need for a range of policies to tackle various targets (including in this case 
unemployment and social inclusion) and the need to integrate these into a coherent 
industrial strategy at various levels of governance, whether regional and/or national. 
This has important implications for the form of any ‘new’ industrial policy. 
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Introduction 
Whilst ‘industrial policy’ in some form seems back on the agenda of politicians at the 
national and European levels, one dimension of industrial policy never really went 
away, namely the attraction of FDI in order to stimulate economic development.  
Indeed, for the much of the last quarter century, this could be seen as the dominant 
aspect of British industrial policy (Bailey et al, 1994, Driffield and Taylor, 2000) – and 
remains highly significant today. The consensus view amongst policy makers and 
international organisations is that FDI brings a ‘package’ of benefits including new 
technologies, skills upgrading, and the generation of jobs and exports (see for 
example EBRD, 1998). In the British case this has involved over many years the use 
of substantial subsidies to attract FDI.  
 
The purpose of this paper is firstly to chart the evolution of British industrial policy in 
recent years, noting its key features in terms of discontinuity, inconsistency, 
reactiveness and a general (with some exceptions) liberal stance. During the 1990s 
British industrial policy followed trends elsewhere in stressing the significance of 
‘competitiveness’ (largely meaning productivity, albeit often obscured in the policy 
literature). Whilst potentially opening up a wide range of potential policy interventions, 
the apparent shift from sectoral to horizontal measures during the 1990s in fact 
largely reduced the content of national level industrial policy (Wren, 2001). Rather, 
there was a narrowing of focus around the coalescing themes of support for small 
firms, attraction of foreign firms (FDI) and science and technology, all increasingly 
delivered via a regionally-based approach. Indeed, during the late 1990s and post 
2000, British industrial policy has been recast at the regional level, with the new 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) given responsibility for delivering industrial 
policy, in terms of targeting so-called ‘clusters’, attracting FDI and a broader social 
inclusion agenda. FDI, traditionally seen as a cornerstone of regional policy, is still 
viewed as particularly important in this regionally-based industrial policy, with a 
continued focus on attracting FDI: (i) to reduce structural unemployment; and (ii) to 
reduce inequalities, both intra-regionally via reduced unemployment and inter-
regionally via raised productivity through technology transfer and spillover effects.   
 
The paper then moves on to examine the compatibility and effectiveness of two of 
these fundamental aims of regionally-delivered British industrial policy; the desire to 
increase skill intensities with British industry, and attracting inward investment in 
order to stimulate labour demand, particularly in those regions or industries that have 
experienced economic decline and restructuring over the past twenty years. By 
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constructing and testing a model of labour demand for British manufacturing industry, 
we show that these two aspirations are to a large extent inconsistent.  This in turn 
suggests the need for a broader approach to industrial policy, where more 
instruments are used to target these quite different policy goals within an overall 
strategy. This is a significant issue given that governments are now reappraising the 
role for and extent of a ‘new industrial policy’.  Furthermore, inward investment 
agencies such as Invest UK have been reappraising their own approach, targeting 
smaller investments in recent years, raising the question of how this fits in with the 
broader objectives highlighted above.  Overall, there is a need to understand how a 
policy to attract and retain FDI fits with other aspects of a ‘new industrial policy’; 
where it is consistent with other policy goals, where inconsistent, and what else 
needs to be done as part of any ‘new’ policy given the strategic objectives set by 
policy makers. We echo Cowling and Sugden (1993) in arguing that a strategic 
overview is required at regional and national levels in understanding how different 
policies should fit together. 
 
This paper extends the work of Bailey and Driffield (2002), Driffield and Taylor (2000) 
and Taylor and Driffield (2005) in evaluating the impacts of FDI on employment in 
domestic firms. This literature, following Barrell and Pain (1997), demonstrates that 
inward investment generally acts to increase the relative demand for skilled labour, 
and in turn increases wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. 
However, this paper extends existing work in two novel ways. Firstly, we evaluate the 
effects of investment by large domestic firms as well as foreign firms, on the relative 
demand for skilled and unskilled labour, and secondly we allow for both trade and 
technology effects in factor demand. 
  
2. The Evolution of British Industrial Policy 
Whilst there is much disagreement on how best to characterise British industrial policy 
since the Second World War (Reynolds and Coates, 1996), cutting through the detail of 
that debate, key aspects of British industrial policy have arguably been discontinuity, 
inconsistency, reactiveness and a liberal stance, with a recent emphasis on 
‘competitiveness’ (as noted above an often obscured term largely meaning productivity) 
and a decentralised approach focused on clusters. 
 
Discontinuity has come with sharp reversals of certain policies as the ideologies of 
governments have differed, for example nationalisation in the 1960s and 1970s followed 
by privatisation from the 1980s until today.  Similarly, a concern to promote large firms 
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or “national champions” in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to a desire to support smaller 
firms later on, while an apparent focus on manufacturing in the 1960s and 1970s gave 
way to a ‘neutral’ stance on the issue of manufacturing versus services-led growth 
(Pitelis, 1994). The major exception has been the continuity seen in policy towards 
FDI and transnational corporations (TNCs), with both foreign- and British-based 
transnationals being given a free rein over many years (Bailey et al, 1994; 1999). 
 
Inconsistency has also been seen in many areas of policy. In competition policy, for 
example, governments have accepted the need to correct for market failures, whilst at 
the same time maintaining weak and ineffective monopoly and merger policies (Pitelis, 
1994). Although the post-1997 Labour governments have sought to strengthen some 
aspects of competition policy, Labour backtracked on proposals to tighten merger 
controls in the wake of business lobbying.  More seriously, some commentators have 
argued that British experience has been one of “industrial policies without an industrial 
strategy” (Cowling and Sugden, 1993).2  In line with Pitelis (2003), industrial policies can 
be seen as measures designed to improve the performance of industry, whilst an 
industrial ‘strategy’ might consist of a well thought-out set of industrial policies that are 
reasonably consistent and coherent with the aim of realising well-defined, long-term 
objectives.  
 
Taking this further, reactiveness is seen in the sense that policy has been characterised 
by re-active, ad-hoc measures taken in response to crises, whether the crisis in the coal 
industry or the BSE (‘mad cow’) scare in the 1990s, or more recently the Rover crisis in 
2000 and the MG Rover collapse in 2005.3 Reactiveness is also seen in the motivation 
of government intervention itself.  A reactive policy can be defined as one that solely 
reacts to correct market failures (externalities, public goods, monopolies etc.) or in 
response to crises.  In contrast, as Jacquemin (1987, in Oughton, 1997) notes, a more 
proactive approach goes beyond market failure, and considers strategies which 
“deliberately influence the transformation and the industrial reorganization of sectors, 
and nations”, noting that “in many sectors comparative advantages are based on 
partially controllable elements”.  He points to policies that might alter the accumulation 
of physical and human capital over time, which in turn might alter relative capital 
endowments. The experiences of MITI (whether or not one accepts how successful 
                                                          
2 Cowling and Sugden’s definition of ‘strategy’ here goes beyond the coherence of industrial 
policies and includes a concern with strategic decision making (1993, 1994). 
3 The British government was heavily criticised for not foreseeing the Rover crisis in 2000, 
with the DTI in particular criticised for its lack of information gathering (House of Commons, 
2000). 
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these were; see Bailey, 2003) up until the 1980s could be seen as such a pro-active 
approach, in contrast with British experience. 
 
Connected with this reactive approach, it can be argued that British industrial policy 
over many years has on the whole been liberal, built on a belief that industrial 
performance is best left in private hands, assisted only at the margin by state activity 
(Reynolds and Coates, 1996).4  As Wilks (in Reynolds and Coates, 1996) notes,  
“a major operational value of British industrial policy is not maintenance of 
market principles (as in Germany)... or the productivity of the enterprise (as in 
Japan) but rather a concern to sustain the autonomy of the firm. This concern 
might be regarded as the purest of market principles or, more correctly, as 
the ultimate market ethic, since it really presupposes that national economic 
benefit (good of all) is derived only from the individual’s (in this case the 
individual firm’s) interpretation and unfettered pursuit of personal benefit”. 
 
This is not to say that there have not been specific interventions at certain points in 
time, most notably in the 1960s to encourage large size and to ‘pick winners’ or back 
so-called ‘national champions’ (Pitelis, 1994). However, there is widespread 
acceptance that such policies failed (Pitelis, 1994; Cowling et al, 1999).  As a result, 
such sectoral measures were arguably withdrawn in the 1980s. The latter is viewed 
as a period of withdrawal of state support and a decline in regional expenditure and 
privatisation, with an apparent re-focusing of industrial policy around horizontal 
measures with the aim of “providing the right underlying conditions to catalyse and 
facilitate growth in the context of declining trade barriers and increased competition” 
(Oughton, 1997). However, as Oughton stresses, such a withdrawal was not 
complete; with 60% of the government R&D budget remaining spent in just two 
sectors - defence and civil aerospace, ‘the extent of the reorientation of industrial 
policy is open to question’.  Somewhat controversially, El-Agraa (1997) suggests that 
industrial policy only comprises sectoral measures and that horizontal policy falls 
outside the remit of industrial policy. This view is out of line with traditional definitions 
of industrial policy and indeed with the literature suggesting a shift form sectoral to 
horizontal industrial policy in recent years (Cowling et al, 1999).  Moreover, Cowling 
et al (1999) make the critical point that the perception of a shift towards horizontal 
measures is to a large extent misplaced as targeting of some form or another is an 
intrinsic part of virtually all industrial policies.  
                                                          
4 This is rejected by Lee (1999) who argues that Britain has ‘consistently implemented its own 
developmental strategy which has enthusiastically embraced technocratic departments of 
state, industrial policy and the sustained deployment of expertise in science and technology’. 
The difference with Germany and Japan, he argues, is that in Britain’s’ case this has been in 
the military rather than civilian sectors.  
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2.2 The Rise of ‘Competitiveness Policy’5 
Leaving aside this question of the extent of the perceived shift from sectoral to 
horizontal support, it was certainly the case that the 1990s saw a re-assessment of 
industrial policy.  Indeed, despite a generally laissez faire approach by the then 
Conservative governments, the 1994, 1995 and 1996 White Papers identified ten broad 
areas influencing so-called ‘competitiveness’, including: the macro economy, education 
and training, labour markets, innovation, management, fair and open markets, finance 
for business, communications and infrastructure, the commercial framework and 
government/business procurement (Oughton, 1997). As Wren rightly notes, these 
papers along with the 1998 Labour White Paper potentially broadened the scope of 
British industrial policy. Indeed, the 1994 White Paper alone identified over 300 
measures to improve economic performance.  In practice, however, the shift from 
sectoral to horizontal approaches ‘in fact helped much reduce the content of this policy’ 
(Wren, 2001). 
 
With the concern for productivity growth, ‘competitiveness’ has become the ‘Holy 
Grail’ of industrial policy under the both Conservative and recent Labour 
governments (see DTI 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998). In the British case, 
‘competitiveness’ has had a potentially inconsistent, multi-level dimension. At the firm 
level, the British government (DTI, 1994) defined this largely in terms of productivity, 
as “the ability to produce the right goods and services of the right quality, at the right 
price, at the right time. It means meeting customers’ needs more efficiently than other 
firms”. At the national level, though, the much-quoted OECD (1992) definition was 
used. This is the degree to which the country can “under free and fair market 
conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test of international markets, 
while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its people in the 
long run”. This is seen as both vague and unnecessarily restrictive by Pitelis (2003).  
While Porter (1990) suggested the substitution of the notion of national 
competitiveness with that of firms and sectors, Pitelis (2003) suggests that this is 
problematic in that the competitiveness of firms need not translate into an 
improvement of economic welfare of the country itself.  In this vein, Oughton (1997) 
notes that firm-level and national definitions are only compatible if improved 
                                                          
5 Much recent debate over industrial policy refers to competitiveness, with theoretical 
foundations in part taken from trade theory and growth theory.  This has yet to feed through 
into defining policy goals and instruments more precisely. For example, viewing comparative 
advantage endogenously opens up perspectives on productive growth and factor 
accumulation, especially human capital, as important issues in the industrial policy debate. 
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competitiveness at the firm level is achieved whilst maintaining employment levels 
nationally. A firm may down-size and shed labour to improve productivity and hence 
competitiveness but if the workers laid off are not absorbed by other firms or 
industries then part of the benefits accruing at the firm or industry level may be offset 
at the national level by the income reductions from the lay-offs.   
 
For these reasons, Pitelis (2003) instead favours a broader definition of 
competitiveness defined as “the improvement of a subjectively defined welfare 
indicator for a country, over time and/or in relation to other countries”. Whilst avoiding 
some of the problems of other definitions, Pitelis admits that the issue of how to 
choose a generally accepted welfare criterion remains.  Branston et al (2006 
forthcoming) see value in this definition, for example in capturing the term’s relative 
nature of competitiveness, not in terms of localities in competition but rather their 
relative success as compared to others in achieving particular objectives. However, 
they see the subjective index as too vague and instead suggest a more focused 
perspective that sees competitiveness in terms of democratically determined 
objectives for development in a specific locality. To be competitive, they argue, is to 
satisfy those objectives effectively as compared to other localities. Whilst this could 
include success in international markets as in the DTI definition, it could potentially 
go much further. As they note, it also has the advantage of explaining the basis for 
choice; democracy. This is of particular relevance below, both in terms of the debate 
over cluster policy at the regional level, where policy can be seen as a revival of 
sectoral measures, and in terms of recognising the multi-faceted nature of 
competitiveness when it is broadly defined, thus requiring a variety of policy 
interventions. 
 
Critically, the Conservative governments of the 1990s did not identify any British 
under-performance in investment (in fixed or intangible assets), and thus felt that no 
government intervention was required to improve the rate of investment.  In contrast, 
during the 1990s the EU did prioritise the promotion of full employment, and hence 
the need to raise investment rates in Europe so as to increase capacity and 
productivity (Oughton, 1997). This lack of attention to employment as an issue in 
British industrial policy largely reflected the reduction in unemployment through the 
1990s, in contrast with much of the rest of the EU (Wren, 2001).  Labour’s 1998 
White Paper (DTI, 1998) represented a significant change in this respect in that it 
recognised, for the first time, the need to improve the rate of investment. The Labour 
government subsequently introduced a number of measures such as reform of the 
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tax system on dividend payments in an attempt to encourage the retention of profits, 
the use of tax credits to raise investment in R&D, and the introduction of Regional 
Venture Capital Funds to improve the supply of funding for small firms.  In this sense 
some of the more interesting recent industrial policy measures have been run by the 
Treasury rather than the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), reflecting the long-
term dominance of the former in British economic policy making (Theakston, 1996).  
 
Whilst the Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown has therefore introduced some 
interesting supply-side measures and competition policy has been strengthened in 
limited respects, the emphasis of industrial policy under Labour continues to be on 
competitiveness or productivity, albeit encompassing a new recognition of the need 
to improve the rate of investment (see also DTI, 2005), with a narrowing of focus 
around the merging themes of support for small firms, attraction of foreign firms, 
science and technology and regional development policy. Wren (2001) suggests that 
the 2001-2005 Labour government defined productivity growth as the key theme of 
economic policy, leading him to follow Krugman in stating that “for competitiveness 
we can read productivity”. Similarly, Branston et al (2006 forthcoming) note that the 
1998 White paper placed a heavy emphasis on competitiveness in terms of 
productivity, innovation and high-value, which they saw as “partial and blinkered 
approach, defined in terms of market success; all that altered was the criteria 
emphasised in the free market game”.   
 
It is interesting to note here that industrial policy has almost become wholly divorced 
from trade policy. Indeed, despite the theoretical analysis of strategic trade policy, 
such as the work by Brander and Spencer (1985) or Eaton and Grossman (1986), 
intervention in trade is no longer on the political agenda. Indeed, most current policy 
analysis is based firmly on the view that free trade is wholly beneficial, to both 
exporting and importing countries.6 
 
More recently still, in line with the European Commission, the DTI has stressed that 
“competitiveness increasingly relies on a country’s appropriate structures of roles, 
institutions and processes to enable, organise, and drive efforts to improve business 
environment and clusters” (Porter and Ketels, 2003). It is to this which we turn next. 
 
                                                          
6 We refer to strategic trade policy in passim here only because of space constraints. It should 
be noted that the important debate over this has had proper theoretical foundations and has 
questioned the free trade paradigm (see also Cowling and Sugden, 1998). 
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2.3 Regions and Clusters: A New Paradigm or Sectors All over Again?  
Most notable since 1997 has been the decentralisation of industrial policy to Regional 
Development Agencies in the English regions, modelled on experience in Scotland, 
albeit with significantly less funding.  These have provided the opportunity at least for 
more pro-active policies to be developed at the regional level, generally via two main 
and interlinked economic development strategies: the attraction of transnationals and 
the support of clusters via cluster policies. Indeed, a key feature of the 1998 White 
Paper under Labour was the signalling of exactly this shift towards a focus on higher 
quality inward investment and to emphasising clusters. 
 
Underpinning this shift to the regional level as the focus for industrial policy design 
and delivery in Britain and elsewhere has been an apparent intellectual legitimacy 
granted by the so-called ‘New Regionalism’ (NR) perspective that has gained 
currency amongst scholars and the policy community in recent years.  The NR is 
shorthand for various streams of literature that have emphasised the significance of 
the regional level as the most effective basis for post-Fordist economic management.  
Its origins lay with studies of the post-Fordist mode of flexible specialisation by 
researchers such as Piore and Sabel (1984), Markusen (1996) and Storper (1995, 
1997) which looked at the success stories of the new “industrial spaces” such as 
Silicon Valley and Rhone Alps, and which drew on Beccatini’s seminal work on Italian 
industrial districts (Pyke et al, 1990). Following the identification of these regionally 
based, flexible specialisation success stories, researchers from various disciplines 
have emphasised the regional level of analysis (see Bailey, 2003a).7  Whilst 
emerging from varying discourses, these approaches share a common view that 
regional success or competitive advantage is to a large part embedded in social 
capital (Putnam, 1993).  The end result was the predominant view that far from 
heralding the end of geography, globalisation is instead prompting a refocusing on 
localized geographical agglomeration and spatial clustering, with “the regional scale 
canonized as a ‘functional space’ for economic planning and political governance” 
(see MacLeod, 2001).  And it was Porter himself who argued that “competitive 
advantage is created and sustained through a highly localized process” where 
                                                          
7 See Piore and Sable (1984) on ‘regional conglomerations’ of firms; Saxenian (1994) on the 
relative regional advantage of Route 128 and Silicon Valley; Amin and Thrift (1994) on the 
‘institutional thickness’ of regions; Florida (1995) on US ‘learning regions’; Storper (1995) on 
the region as a ‘nexus of untraded interdependencies’; Scott (1996) on regions as ‘motors’ in 
the new economic order; and Cooke and Morgan (1998) on the ‘associational economy’ of  
some European regions. 
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“national competitive advantage… resides as much at the level of the cluster as it 
does in individual industries” (Porter, 1998).   
 
Against the backdrop of this broader intellectual debate focusing on the regional 
scale and clusters, and the evolution and acceptance of these concepts in the policy 
community, British industrial policy post-1997 was effectively re-orientated around 
the regional scale through RDAs with an emphasis on cluster policies a la Porter.  It 
has become de rigueur to accept that the regional scale to industrial policy is vital in 
delivering competitiveness, and in turn needs to build and support regionally-based 
clusters underpinned by social capital, organisational capacity and the provision of 
collective services. However, the assumptions underpinning this industrial policy 
paradigm shift have not gone without criticisms.  For example, clusters have been 
criticised as “old wine in new bottles” (McCrone, 1999) and too vague a concept to be 
useful.  Some see the term as a simple 're-badging' in many cases of sectors (Peck 
and McGuiness, 2003, in Waters and Smith, 2002) while Martin and Sunley (2003) 
see it as a 'chaotic concept’ which should carry a ‘public policy health warning’. The 
latter note that building successful clusters can bring advantages in terms of 
increased innovation, growth, productivity, competitiveness, new firm formation and 
higher job growth.  However, they note potential costs in terms of the danger of 
technological isomorphism, labour cost inflation, inflation of land and housing costs, 
widening income disparities, institutional and industrial lock-in, over-specialisation 
and local congestion and environmental pressure (ibid).   
 
In practical policy-application terms, there is also considerable confusion over what 
the term ‘cluster’ actually means (see for example Bailey, 2003a). Tully and Berkeley 
(2004) even suggest that many RDAs now prefer the term ‘sector’ and are “quietly 
walking away from the cluster concept, but are just not telling the DTI”. Although too 
early to confirm, whilst nationally there has been a shift from sectoral to horizontal 
approaches, more locally we may now be observing the re-emergence of sectoral 
policies all over again, where the ubiquitous regionally-based cluster policy can be 
seen as a new form of localised industrial targeting, with similar inherent dangers as 
at the national level of picking the ‘wrong’ ‘clusters’ if the selection process is 
dominated by an elite group and selection processes are not democratic (Cowling et 
al, 1999).8 This links back to earlier definitions of competitiveness; a democratic 
                                                          
8 Although it should be noted that there are powerful arguments for conducting industrial 
policy at as local a scale a possible (see Begg et al, 1995). 
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process of cluster selection could be seen as crucial if a society is to target the 
development of competitive clusters.  
 
This in turns links with Lovering’s comments on the dangers inherent within such 
approaches of diverting public resources to supporting a special set of interests 
(Lovering, 2001) and the need to deflate the new regionalism “hegemony” in part 
through a more “genuinely pluralistic approach to strategy formation” (Lovering, 
1999). Echoing Markusen (1996) we can say that regionally-based clusters and 
hence polices are slippery concepts in slippery spaces.   
 
In practical terms, it needs to be recognised that ‘clusters’ and/or sectors often 
extend well beyond the region in question and that an isolated regional initiative may 
not be enough: linked initiatives across regions, perhaps co-ordinated nationally, are 
required to assist some clusters.  Whilst the regionalisation of industrial policy in 
Britain through decentralisation to RDAs has brought genuine advantages in 
developing and tailoring industrial policies to suit local needs, it also brings possible 
dangers in the form of competing and overlapping regional initiatives that are 
insufficiently co-ordinated when the ‘cluster’ or sector in question extends across 
regional borders.  As Peck and McGuiness (2001, in Waters and Lawton Smith, 
2002) note “the alternative involving greater collaboration between regions in 
developing cluster strategies has yet to be taken seriously”.  Despite, or perhaps 
because of, the retrenchment of national-level industrial policy in Britain and the shift 
to the regional scale, there is clearly a key role for national level coordination of 
regional strategies. At the moment this is lacking.   
 
Paradoxically, simultaneous to this lack of inter-RDA coordination of cluster policies, 
central government in Britain has been excessively restrictive and interventionist over 
exactly which clusters and technologies to support as part of regionally delivered 
industrial policies. Indeed, Charles and Benneworth (2001) argue that it has 
determined which clusters are important and has refused to delegate science and 
technology policy to the regional level.9  This might help to explain why the clusters 
targeted by different RDAs across the UK are so remarkably similar. Indeed, many 
target the same ‘list’ (including automotive, ICT, creative industries and media, food 
and drink, and biotechnology). Andriani et al (2005) note the “astonishing overlap” in 
                                                          
9 Despite the apparent shift away sectoral industrial policy in the 1990s noted above, 
paradoxically science and technology policy became highly interventionist through the use of 
‘sector panels’ and greater control by government and industry over the agenda for basic 
research, echoing the ‘old approach to industrial policy of ‘picking winners’’ (Oughton, 1997).  
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regional cluster policies, commenting that “it stretches credibility to believe that the 
UK could be home to half a dozen or more successful biotech clusters. Thus most 
strategies (if not all) will fail, raising the question of whether this constitutes an 
appropriate direction of public funds”. 
 
At another scale but in similar vein, Waters and Lawton Smith (2002) argue against 
“the local application of top-down policy”. This top-down, dirigiste approach has been 
heightened by central government constraints on the limited resources available to 
the English RDAs in comparison with devolved agencies in Scotland and Wales (see 
Lee, 1999; Bailey, 2003a).  Whilst the total budget of RDAs rose by £500 million to 
£1.2 billion in 2003, individual budgets remain dwarfed by their Scottish equivalent.  
In the West Midlands case the retention of the £129 million of RSA assistance within 
the region (which was initially earmarked for a BMW investment) in 2000 and another 
£150 million of government assistance in 2005 can be seen as an implicit recognition 
that the RDA did not have sufficient resources to tackle a problem of the scale of the 
MG Rover collapse.10 Furthermore, RDAs in general have faced limited flexibility over 
the limited spending available to them, being heavily constrained by pre-ordained first 
by top-down ‘silos’ of funding and then by very specific central government target 
setting (Fuller et al, 2002). The paradox thus arises that RDAs are overly constrained 
in terms of their ability to pursue strategic objectives in terms of regional industrial 
policy, but that their efforts to foster the development of local ‘clusters’ or ‘sectors’ are 
insufficiently coordinated on a national or inter-regional basis (Bailey, 2003a).   
 
National level policy over a range of issues is not neutral in this respect, with the 
broader role of central government crucial in constraining or facilitating regional level 
policy initiatives.  Indeed, even the most sophisticated regional-level industrial policy 
can run into the constraints and incompatibilities of national-level policy.  For 
example, ‘cluster’ policies and more general industrial policy goals in a 
manufacturing-orientated region can be undermined by major exchange rate 
fluctuations (Bailey, 2003a). Furthermore, whilst it is widely accepted that local 
production systems can be improved by firms - whether domestic or foreign - that 
bring new technology and investment, they can also be damaged through takeovers.  
Indeed, Harrison (1994) notes that incoming firms often bring engineering talent to 
clusters, a commitment to manufacturing excellence, and access to overseas 
                                                          
10 This also illustrates another aspect of industrial policy in terms of structural change and 
adjustment, with policy at times not only aiming to speed adjustment but also to shape its 
direction. Witness the role of policy in the wake of problems at Rover (see Bailey 2003a). 
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markets, but not a commitment to local economic development.  National level 
competition policy needs to take this on board in protecting local production systems 
for example via monitoring the impact of incoming firms (see Bailey et al, 1999).  
What might be relevant here is monitoring at a sub-national level as part of regional 
industrial policy so as to inform and develop national-level policy on takeovers.   In 
this way national and regional level policy could be coordinated, and a regional 
dimension added to competition policy (Bailey, 2003a).   
 
This can be extended to encompass policies aimed at attracting FDI. The possibility 
that FDI can act as a channel to promote new ‘cluster’ formation has become 
increasingly explicit. However, FDI-generated clusters have often proven to be 
fragile, short-term, and driven in a top-down manner. All too often, the transnational 
does not embed itself in the locality but simply relocates if economic conditions 
change. There tends to be little or no technology transfer and, if there are spin-offs 
from the transnational these tend to be to sub-contractors for whom the transnational 
is the only buyer. De Propris and Driffield (2005) present an analysis of this, 
suggesting that while pre-existing clusters are attractive to inward investors, there is 
less evidence that inward FDI acts as a conduit to cluster formation. This raises the 
need for the careful use of policy to attract FDI that complements embedded cluster 
development, rather than attempting to build clusters in a ‘top-down’ way around 
mobile transnationals. It is to FDI policy that we turn next.  
 
 
2.4 FDI Policy 
As noted in the introduction, the British government has welcomed incoming FDI for 
bringing “new jobs, new management techniques, innovation, dynamism and 
competition to the economy” (Blair, 2002), and has backed this up with substantial 
subsidies.11  This view is supported by academics such as Eltis (1996) who see 
foreign transnationals in particular as raising quality and productivity levels.12  At the 
regional level the emphasis for many years for the less favoured regions of Britain 
has been on alleviating structural unemployment via inward investment inflows 
                                                          
11 Evidence on this support is limited. Brech and Sharp (1984) estimated that in 1981-1982 
the overall level of assistance offered by the British government to incoming transnationals 
was £1.5 billion. Excluding tax relief their estimate was £370 million.  Girma et al (2001) note 
that in attracting Samsung and Siemens to the North East, the British government provided 
$30 000 and $50 000 per worker respectively, while Cowling et al (1999) cite a figure of 
£42,000 subsidy per job created in attracting FDI to Wales in the late 1990s. 
12 See Girma et al (2001).  Driffield (2001) explores the subtleties involved in evaluating the 
effects of FDI in bringing superior technology, such as the motivation behind the investment. 
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(Yannopoulos and Dunning, 1976) using regional support for assisted areas 
(Gripaios et al, 1997).   With the decentralisation of industrial policy to RDAs noted 
above, there has been intensified competition between agencies to attract FDI 
through subsidy packages.13 The RDAs generally pursue two main and interlinked 
economic development strategies in creating and supporting employment: the 
attraction of transnationals and the support of clusters via cluster policies, with the 
latter often dependent on the former through monopsonistic supply chains based 
around foreign investors such as in the car or electronics industry.  Such approaches 
form part of wider regional economic strategies that stress the need to foster social 
inclusion and reduced long-term unemployment (see for example Advantage West 
Midlands, 1999 and Benneworth, 2001).14  
 
In fact during the 1990s there was something of a re-emphasising of the role of 
inward investment for regional development after a decade or so of emphasis in 
industrial policy on the potential of small firms and indigenous entrepreneurship.15  
Partly, as Amin and Tomaney (1995) note, this can be related to the sense amongst 
some researchers that the nature of the multi-locational firm was changing with a 
distinction drawn between the traditional top-down ‘cost-driven’ transnational and the 
so-called ‘performance firm’ which “derives its competitive advantage from product 
excellence and seeks locations which can offer qualified personnel and innovation-
rich environments” (see Amin and Tomaney, 1995).  The latter is seen as bringing a 
range of attributes - including a wider range of functions, local decision-making 
authority, more extensive and superior local linkages and a more strategic position 
within the firm - which are more likely to benefit regional host economies.  Yet in 
reality, as Amin and Tomaney (1995) note, in less favoured regions the term 
“flagship” often more appropriately refers to the international reputation of the firm, 
not the quality of the inward investment.  Such ‘performance’ plants are few and far 
between in peripheral regions and seem instead to locate in core regions.    
   
                                                          
13 Witness for example the bidding war in 1997 between two British regions, Wales and the 
North, to win a plant of the Taiwanese-based computer firm Acer. 
14 See the Regional Economic Strategy of Advantage West Midlands which stresses the need 
for “greater social and economic cohesiveness” and the need to make opportunities 
“accessible to those people who are experiencing social exclusion” (Advantage West 
Midlands, 1999: 3).  It also notes the need to tackle “concentrations of high unemployment 
and accompanying social deprivation” (ibid). 
15 Which in turn came after the wave of branch plants established in the 1960s and 1970s 
failed to deliver an industrialisation benefiting regional host economies through skills 
upgrading, technology transfer, linkages, new management techniques or retained profits 
(see Amin and Tomaney, 1995). 
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For the British regions at least the emphasis has been on using inward investment to: 
(i) reduce structural unemployment; and (ii) to reduce inequalities, both intra-
regionally via (i) and inter-regionally via raised productivity through technology 
transfer and spillover effects.   
 
3. FDI and domestic employment 
Having reviewed the development of British industrial policy above, our purpose now 
is to examine the compatibility and effectiveness of two fundamental aims of 
regionally-delivered British industrial policy, i.e. the desire to increase skill intensities 
and attracting inward investment in order to stimulate labour demand, particularly in 
such regions and/or industries that have experienced economic decline and 
restructuring. The model used is based on a relatively standard factor demand, 
following Barrell and Pain (1997, 1999) for example. Barrell and Pain (1997, 1999) 
focus on the demand for unskilled labour as an indicator of technological change, 
and while our model is employed in a similar spirit, it seeks to capture wider effects 
than merely new technology replacing unskilled workers, including an analysis on the 
effects on the demand for skilled workers.  
 
We extend the analysis of Barrell and Pain (1997) in several ways. Firstly, in line with 
the large and developing FDI spillovers literature, we distinguish between foreign and 
domestic owned sectors of the UK.16 Furthermore, we also focus on smaller 
manufacturing firms, by examining the effects on firms other than the leading five in a 
given industry. Most policy initiatives, as discussed above, are targeted at these 
firms, and yet much current analysis ignores this when evaluating the effects of FDI, 
by employing data which by construction focuses attention on the largest firms. 
Constructing a broader data set in this way offers a further extension, in that we are 
able to contrast the effects of inward investment on labour demand, with the effects 
generated by investment by large UK owned firms. The extent to which there is a 
difference between these effects will offer a greater understanding of the importance 
and effectiveness of FDI policy within the context of UK industrial policy. 
 
3.1 The Model 
A full discussion of this is provided in Barrell and Pain (1997): however, to 
summarise, starting with a standard CES production function: 
                                                          
16 For a discussion of the FDI spillovers literature within the context of UK regional policy see 
Driffield (2005), or for a wider discussion see Görg and Strobl (2001) or Görg and Greenaway 
(2004).  
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where A>0, and 0<s<1.  Returns to scale are given by:      11  LKss . 
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The t term then captures exogenous changes in factor demand, that Barrell and 
Pain (1997, 1999) relate to FDI and a time trend. We extend this firstly to distinguish 
between the long run effects of FDI (foreign share of an industry) and new FDI 
effects. Barrell and Pain (1997) ascribe all the effect of inward FDI acting to reduce 
the demand for unskilled labour to a “long run” technology effect, as inward 
investment introduces new technology then the demand for skilled labour is reduced. 
However, if one considers the effect of new inward FDI on incumbent firms, then 
there is also the possibility of a competitive or crowding out process, as inward 
investment crowds out domestic firms. Thus, we also include new flows of inward 
investment in our analysis. Further, to capture additional effects though R&D 
expenditure, exports, and capital investment by large UK firms (DI5). The definitions 
and some descriptive statistics of these variables are given below. Specifically this 
employs data for the largest five firms in a given industry.  
As such the expression for t  becomes:  
RDDIIMPIFDITIMEt lnlnlnln 54321     (4) 
 
As such, the final equation that is estimated becomes:  
Ln (Lit) = a +b1 ln(Qit) +b2 ln(Wit) + b3 ln IFDIit +b4 lnIMPit+b5 ln DIit+b6 lnRDit+b7*DI5 + 
b8ln(FSHAREit) + uit     ….(5) 
Where uit=ai+t+it 
There is however a further consideration, that there is a degree of persistence in Lit, 
such that lagged values of Lit should be included in the model. (4) therefore becomes 
a dynamic equation: 
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Ln (Lit) = a + b0Lit-1 +b1 ln(Qit) +b2 ln(Wit) + b3 ln(IFDIit) +b4 ln(IMPit)+b5 ln(DIit)+ b6 
ln(RDit)+b7*ln(DIit) + b8ln(FSHAREit) + uit     ….(5) 
 
Furthermore, we offer an additional extension of this approach, by incorporating a 
partial adjustment process in factor demand, such that one is modelling changes in 
employment towards equilibrium, as well as explaining the static employment level. 
This is crucial when considering the external impacts on employment, as it allows for 
a distinction between internal moves towards equilibrium, and changes as a result of 
external pressures, following Hamermesh (1995). (5) then becomes: 
 
ln (Lit) = a + b0Lit-1 +b1 ln(Qit) +b2 ln(Wit) + b3 ln IFDIit +b4 ln IMPit+ 
b5 ln DIit+b6 lnRDit+b7lnDI5 + b8 ln(FSHAREit) + (Lit-1-1ln Qit-1-2ln Wit-1) + uit     
….(6) 
 
 
3.2 The Data 
The data used here are for the UK sector only, and for firms other than the leading 
five in any given industry. The UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) provided the 
foreign ownership data used here. These are derived from the raw data on which the 
Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), formerly the Census of Production (CP) is based.17 
The definitions of value added, capital investment and the distinction between 
manual and non-manual workers can be found in any UK Annual Business Inquiry, or 
at www.statistics.gov.uk.The data used here are industry level data (3 digit) data for 
the period from 1980-1996 (after which any consistent skilled / unskilled distinction is 
removed from the UK census)18. The data allow us to distinguish between investment 
by foreign firms, and investment by large UK owned firms, in terms of the effects that 
this investment has on the remainder of the sector. As such, the analysis focuses on 
the domestic sector, and also firms other than the largest five in any given 3 digit 
industry.  All the data are annual, and all monetary data are deflated using the 
appropriate 3 digit industry consumer price index. 
 
The variables 
                                                          
17 Further discussion of the data collection methodology is provided in Jones (2002).  
18 Data for these series are available from 1980-1996 inclusive. However, these was a 
change in the Standard Industry Classification in 1992, rendering the construction of a 
consistent panel impossible. However, it is possible to link the series across the break, such 
that while it remained impossible to estimate a consistent model for the full time series, further 
lags of the structural variables could be used as instruments in the estimation. Due to this, it is 
possible to employ the GMM-IV estimation to the full period 1993-1996. 
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Dependent variable: 
L:  total employment of skilled or unskilled workers in the domestic sector excluding 
the top 5 leading firms. 
Structural variables: 
W: annual industry level average wages for skilled or unskilled workers workers in 
the domestic sector excluding the top 5 leading firms. 
Q: value added at the industry level workers in the domestic sector excluding the top 
5 leading firms. 
Exogenous variables: 
IFDI: industry level capital expenditure by foreign owned firms in the UK  
IMPORTS: industry level imports 
DI: capital expenditure by the five largest domestic firms in the industry 
RD: Industry level R&D, calculated using a perpetual inventory method and a 
depreciation rate of 10%. 
FSHARE: the share of employment of foreign owned firms at the industry level. 
Table 1 illustrates some descriptive statistics for these variables. Foreign owned 
firms in the UK accounted for some 29% of value added over the period, and inward 
investment accounted for more than double the capital investment by the largest UK 
firms. It is also noticeable that the distribution of foreign penetration across industries 
is far from uniform, ranging from two three digit sectors that had no foreign 
involvement, through to sectors such as chemicals, office machinery, motor and 
other vehicles and the wood industry that are dominated by foreign ownership.  
Table 1 here. 
 
3.3 Estimation 
The estimation problems of dynamic models from short panels are well documented 
in the econometric literature (see Baltagi, 2005 and references therein). The 
essential difficulty lies in the fact that, in the presence of fixed effects, the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance term. Standard ‘within’ 
transformation typically used in static models fails to deliver consistent estimators. 
Output is also endogenous within the model, and so is treated as such in a similar 
manner to the lagged dependent variable, in the spirit of Arrellano and Bond (1988, 
1991).  A popular way of circumventing this problem is to remove the fixed effects via 
first-differencing, and instrumenting the lagged dependent variable with further 
lagged values. One can then employ a variant of the instrumental variable estimation 
technique (e.g. GMM-IV). However, the partial adjustment model (6) implies a 
dynamic model in first differences.  Our approach of estimating the system of 
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dynamic panel equations is in the spirit of Holtz-Eakin et al (1988), using lagged 
values as instruments to generate orthogonality conditions on differenced data, and 
employing GMM. This is a slight variation on the more standard GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991) due to the presence of the partial 
adjustment term. The estimator employed here is discussed in some detail in 
Hamermesh (1995), and generates heteroscedastic-consistent estimates. We also 
test for 1st and 2nd order serial correlation: (Doornik et al. 2002). The appropriate AR1 
and AR2 tests are then based on average residual autovariances, which are 
asymptotically distributed N(0,1). Due to the problems of obtaining a consistent time 
series due to the structural break, the model is estimated for the two sub-samples, 
1984-1992 and 1993-1996. In order to perform this estimation, four consecutive 
years of data are required, so as such only one year is available as instruments. 
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(a) Results for 1993-1996. 
 
i. Unskilled labour 
 
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic P-value 
Lit-1 .245706 .139307 1.76377* [.078] 
Structural terms 
Qit .075099 .023118 3.24846** [.001] 
Wit -.334426 .094081 3.55465** [.000] 
Exogenous terms 
     
FDIit-1 -.012854 .00277 -4.63730** [.000] 
Fshareit-1 -.039975 .030407 -1.31465 [.189] 
DIit-1 .011051 .021305 .518730 [.604] 
RDit-1 .024280 .045817 .529929 [.596] 
Importit-1 .027647 .018451 1.49846* [.134] 
Partial adjustment terms 
Qit .678613 .057532 11.7954** [.000] 
Wit -.418039 .067010 -6.23846** [.000] 
Sargan p value 0.109 
AR(1), p value -4.068 (0.044) 
AR(2), p value 1.823 (0.177) 
Goodness of fit: Corr (y, yˆ )  0.719 
 
Standard Errors computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix 
 
ii. Skilled Labour 
 
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic P-value 
Lit-1 .072942 .055683 1.30996 [.190] 
Structural terms 
Qit .086329 .015621 5.52635** [.000] 
Wit -.375343 .083440 -4.49834** [.000] 
Exogenous terms 
FDIit-1 -.002113 .001482 -1.42615 [.154] 
Fshareit-1 -.019918 .012759 -1.56106* [.119] 
DI5it-1 .003267 .006684 .488812 [.625] 
RDit-1 -.031276 .020982 -1.49059* [.136] 
Importit-1 .028806 .011436 2.51901** [.012] 
Partial adjustment terms 
Qit .475018 .036165 13.1347 [.000] 
Wit -.187757 .0150947 -12.438 [.000] 
Sargan p value 0.336 
AR(1), p value -3.598 (0.058) 
AR(2), p value 1.171 (0.187) 
Goodness of fit: Corr (y, yˆ )  0.662 
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(b) Results for 1984 -1992 
 
i. Unskilled labour 
 
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic P-value 
Lit-1 .26133 .17905 1.4595 [.074] 
Structural terms 
Qit .08246 .024114 3.41966** [.000] 
Wit .-0.34799 .10293 3.38092** [.001] 
Exogenous terms 
     
FDIit-1 -.12250 .02970 -4.12392** [.000] 
Fshareit-1 -.03446 .030357 1.13542 [.129] 
DI5it-1 .009946 .02068 .48082 [.316] 
RDit-1 -.025609 .042011 .60956 [.272] 
Importit-1 .028850 .022213 1.29877 [.099] 
Partial adjustment terms 
Qit .59139 .041989 14.0845** [.000] 
Wit -.46309 .074900 -6.18268** [.000] 
Sargan p value 0.322 
AR(1), p value -4.243 (0.039) 
AR(2), p value 1.578 (0.209) 
Goodness of fit: Corr (y, yˆ )  0.771 
 
Standard Errors computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix 
 
ii. Skilled Labour 
 
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic P-value 
Lit-1 .07102 .04724 1.5035* [.068] 
Structural terms 
Qit .10137 .021253 4.7696** [.000] 
Wit -.39186 .010552 -3.7135 [.000] 
Exogenous terms 
FDIit-1 -.018677 .011395 -1.6391* [.052] 
Fshareit-1 -.017497 .011373 -1.5384 [.064] 
DI5it-1 .003263 .005794 .56326 [.288] 
RDit-1 -.032183 .022766 -1.4137 [.080] 
Importit-1 .032926 .013468 2.4447** [.008] 
Partial adjustment terms 
Qit .398316 .032253 12.3496** [.000] 
Wit -.17676 .014732 -11.998** [.000] 
Sargan p value 0.264 
AR(1), p value -4.057 (0.044) 
AR(2), p value 2.569 (0.109) 
Goodness of fit: Corr (y, yˆ )  0.659 
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The first point to note is that the model behaves broadly similar across the two sub 
samples. This confirms the general modelling strategy, and also highlights few 
differences in the results over time. As anticipated, the elasticities of employment 
with respect to output and wages, in both the structural terms and partial adjustment 
terms, are large and significant.  The results confirm that inward FDI does indeed 
impact on labour demand. Interestingly, this effect is significantly greater for the 
earlier time period, when UK manufacturing was declining rapidly. Specifically, 
inward investment acts to reduce employment of unskilled labour in UK firms, though 
the effect is relatively small for the period 1993-1996. What is clear from these results 
is that this decline in unskilled labour is not due to the “technology” effect of FDI, as 
this would be captured by the foreign share variable, as in Barrell and Pain (1997). 
Rather this is due to new foreign investment crowding out domestic employment. 
Indeed, the foreign share effect, while negative, is insignificant for both time periods.  
These results also illustrate the differential effect between the impacts of foreign and 
domestic large scale investment, with large scale domestic investment having no 
discernable effect on employment in UK firms.  
 
Interestingly, imports appear to have a positive effect on employment, particularly of 
skilled workers, suggesting that imports by manufacturing industries are of 
components rather than finished goods. While this result may be considered 
surprising by some, it is never the less consistent with both national and international 
policy stances, i.e. that trade is beneficial both to exporters and importers. 
 
Overall, these results confirm the findings of Barrell and Pain (1997) and Bailey and 
Driffield (2002) that inward FDI does indeed generate a reduction in the demand for 
unskilled labour. While Barrell and Pain (1997) attribute this to the imported 
technology that accompanies inward investment, reducing the relative productivity of 
unskilled labour, it is also likely that there is an element of “crowding out” in domestic 
firms, following Driffield (1999) and Buffie (1993).  As a result, while inward FDI may 
act to increase skill intensities in the UK, it has done little to provide employment for 
unskilled workers, despite the objective of reducing unemployment. 
 
Equally, investment by the largest firms in the industry appears to have little impact 
on employment elsewhere in the sector. This suggests that encouraging or 
subsidising investment by large firms does not appear to stimulate growth in the SME 
sector, as policy makers and providers might hope. Other approaches are therefore 
required as part of a broader regionally-based industrial policy given the multiple 
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policy objectives of RDAs, in particular in relation to fostering successful clusters and 
broader social inclusion (including reducing unemployment). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper argues that British industrial policy has typically shown features of 
discontinuity, inconsistency, reactiveness and a liberal stance.  During the 1990s, 
Britain followed trends elsewhere in stressing the significance of ‘competitiveness’ 
(largely meaning productivity). Whilst potentially opening up a wide range of potential 
policy interventions, the apparent shift from sectoral to horizontal measures during 
the 1990s largely reduced the content of national level industrial policy. Rather, there 
was a narrowing of focus around the coalescing themes of support for small firms, 
attraction of foreign firms (FDI) and science and technology, all increasingly delivered 
via a regionally-based approach. During the late 1990s and post 2000, British 
industrial policy has been recast at the regional level, with the new Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) given responsibility for delivering industrial policy, in 
terms of targeting so-called ‘clusters’, attracting FDI and a broader social inclusion 
agenda. The ‘cluster’ concept has been problematic, however. In some cases sectors 
have simply been rebadged by RDAs as ‘clusters’ and more recently there has been 
the suggestion that RDAs are reverting to using the term sectors. In effect industrial 
policy is still a sectoral policy albeit one delivered at the regional level. In many cases 
the same ‘clusters’ are targeted across regions, in part because the DTI has 
controlled the cluster selection process in a top-down way whilst still pursuing a 
‘surrogate’ industrial policy via its science and technology policy. A range of problems 
in policy design and delivery have been raised by the over-control of cluster selection 
and the simultaneous absence of coordination across regions.  Even if the content of 
the new ‘sectoral’ measures are different (i.e. supporting ‘clusters’ of firms rather than 
‘picking’ large ‘national champions’), there remains the risk of repeating at the 
regional level previous national mistakes over targeting the ‘wrong’ clusters if the 
selection process is not democratically determined. 
 
In pursuing a range of economic objectives including reduced unemployment and 
social inclusion, RDAs still see FDI as particularly important as part of  this regionally-
based industrial policy.  The results in this paper, however, suggest that inward 
investment actually reduces the demand for unskilled labour. In so far as a key 
objective of regionally based industrial policies in attracting inward investment is to 
reduce structural unemployment, it is doubtful as to whether this is achieved by a 
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heavy reliance on inward investment when the effect is to reduce demand for 
unskilled workers (the latter are often those most likely to experience long-term 
unemployment and be the target of policy intervention in the first place).  This 
suggests that there is an incompatibility between the attraction of inward investment 
to reduce unemployment on the one hand and the goal of social inclusion on the 
other, suggesting in turn the need for greater attention in regionally-based industrial 
strategies to assist workers who lose out from such inward investment inflows. 19 
 
More broadly, and in line with Pitelis 2003 and Branston et al 2006, if a 
democratically-determined definition of competitiveness comprises a number of 
different objectives, then any ‘new’ British industrial policy focussed on 
competitiveness has to recognise the need for a range of policies as part of a joined 
up strategy that uses FDI where appropriate but that also requires measures to 
employ and/or train labour as part of an inclusion process.  Similarly, our results 
suggest that encouraging or subsidising investment by large firms does not stimulate 
growth in the SME sector, as policy makers and providers might hope. Other policies 
are therefore required if SME growth is seen as an important object of industrial 
policy.  If this is to be pursued at a regional level, then there needs to be range of 
policies which are democratically determined and which need to be properly aligned 
as part of regional strategies.  This has yet to be properly recognised in regionally-
based industrial policies in Britain.  Rather, there has been the merging of elements 
of previous industrial and regional policies, under the narrow guise of a partial and 
inconsistent definition of ‘competitiveness’, all delivered at the regional level, with 
incompatibilities and tensions arising as a result. 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables (1980-96) 
 
 
Value added  
(£ million) 
Total 
employment
(FTE) 
 
Total 
unskilled 
employment 
(FTE) 
Total skilled 
employment 
(FTE) 
 
Average 
unskilled 
wage  
(£ annual) 
Average 
skilled 
wage 
(£ annual) 
average 903.437 47748 31995 15752 11947.694 12257.6 
st. dev 1102.41 54025.55 3528.569 22094 2820.461 4188.764
minimum 13.000 1400 1100 200 5006.148 6474.627 
maximum 9409.400 313500 195200 168400 34275.3 70055.4 
 FDI 
(£million) 
 
 
Foreign 
share in 
value added
 
Unskilled 
employment 
in top 5 firms 
Skilled 
employment 
in top 5 firms 
Investment 
by top 5 
firms 
(£ million) 
Imports 
(£ million) 
 
 
average 101.171 0.295 10416 5609 42.604 850.393 
st. dev 399.3429 0.144899 13219.77 90453.48 82.94994 1265.836
minimum 0 0.000 400 100 0 0.900 
maximum 6138.106 0.764 110200 71300 961.600 9599.000  
 
All data based on SIC 3 digit industry level data 
FTE = Full Time Equivalent 
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